evaluation arrangements and workload-oriented criteria were unable to effectively assess the 10 impact of social work practices. The study concluded that appropriate legislation is required to 11 safeguard the rights of NGOs.
2 1
Introduction

2
The Chinese government has adopted contracting public services as a new welfare strategy. This 3 is a big departure from its traditional socialist practice, according to which government agencies, 4 rather than non-governmental organisations (NGOs), were the main welfare providers. As a result 5 of this new policy, local governments have been asked to outsource public services to community 6 organisations through a competitive bidding procedure, and welfare officials are responsible for 7 drafting bidding documents, preparing contracts and monitoring service quality. 8 9 However, contracting social services is a new initiative in many parts of China. Social work is also 10 a relatively new subject in Chinese universities. Meanwhile, contracting involves complicated 11 tasks that require 'technical skills, relational skills and conductive governance systems' (Zaidi et 12 al., 2011: 145). The purpose of the study is to examine how outsourcing welfare services shapes 13 the relationship between local governments and NGOs and discuss whether government officials 14 have the necessary capacity to implement this policy. 15 16 This paper uses the Integrated Family Services Centres (IFSCs) in Guangzhou as an example to 17 address the above-mentioned concerns and is comprised of three sections. Section one reviews the 18 relationship between the state and NGOs and also examines the essential capacities for outsourcing 19 social services. Section two analyses the major challenges arising from contracting out the IFSCs 20 in Guangzhou, based on qualitative data from 12 focus group meetings. Section three discusses 21 the implications of China's experience. The Chinese government aims to use the contracting of social services to tackle welfare 2 bureaucracy and meet the public's increasing welfare expectations. Over the past ten years, 3 Chinese leaders have attempted to build a 'moderately prosperous society', which means 'a better 4 social welfare safety net', 'a balanced welfare distribution' and 'a cleaner environment' 5 (Songwanich, 2015) . However, this objective has been severely constrained by its ineffective 6 welfare system, managed by government civil servants who tend to be satisfied with existing 7 policy and are not very motivated to change. After reconstructing its state-owned enterprises, the 8 Chinese government has now turned its attention to its welfare delivery system, increasing the role charities', creating 'a mechanism for running hospitals by non-governmental capital' in order to 19 provide adequate basic public services and improve the quality of medical care. It is clear that the 20 Chinese government has decided to change the role of the state from a direct service provider to a 21 service monitor by contracting out public services to NGOs. NGOs and the state is in three forms -symbolic, asymmetric and strategic. Yang oriented NGOs and involving them in the delivery of public services in China is to maintain 12 political stability and create a favorable environment for market interests.
14
As China is a one-party polity and contracting social services has become its main welfare strategy, 15 it is imperative to examine the contractual relationship between the Chinese government and 16 NGOs, so that associated problems can be early identified and addressed. Firstly, there should be a sufficient number of NGOs to bid for contracts. This is because the Secondly, welfare officials should have good knowledge and experience in drafting service 9 contracts, setting up service assessments, and monitoring the service delivery. They have to define 10 the 'rules and norms' for bidding contracts (Trudeau, 2008 (Trudeau, : 2820 . Moreover, 'appropriate legal 11 and administrative frameworks' need to be set up in order to facilitate cooperation between the is the establishment of an effective monitoring mechanism. This is because the outcomes of social 14 services are 'difficult to measure' as they can be studied from different perspectives and cannot be 15 easily observed in a short time (Lu, 2013: 185 Regarding policy coordination, the supporting framework is limited and collaboration among 16 government departments is unclear. Other problems include the fact that procurement targets 17 overlap several different government departments, policy uniformity, a lack of funds to help 18 develop NGOs and a lack of relevant legislation to support the activities of NGOs. 19 20 Similarly, Teets (2012) points out that although contracting public education to private schools in
21
Shanghai has provided more education and development opportunities for migrant children, the 22 quality of the services is questionable due to the ineffective monitoring measures used by 1 government officials.
3
In short, in order to successfully outsource social services, welfare officials need to be equipped 4 with adequate knowledge in drafting and monitoring service contracts, and also need to work 5 closely with contracted NGOs. Given that contracting welfare services is a big departure from 6 China's traditional welfare delivery, the findings of this study will enhance our understanding of In China, the Guangzhou municipal government is one of the pioneers in purchasing social services 
5
Guangzhou now has the biggest number of SWAs and qualified social workers in Guangdong Province. sub-district ranges from 3,000 to nearly 90,000 (Guangzhou Social Work Web, 2016 Prior to each focus group meeting, participants were informed about which organizations would 7 attend the meeting and the key issues that would be discussed. Also, they were told about the promotes the national birth control policy on the number of children in a family (SWA 42).
11
An SO official admitted that they had asked some social workers from an IFSC to distribute leaflets We worked out a method to assess the bids by focusing on the annual workload output of 12 an IFSC. But we later found that this is a problem. I think the output figures are different work non-stop eight hours a day, like a machine' (SWA 33).
9
Inconsistency in service evaluation
10
As local government officials lacked knowledge and experience in evaluating social services, they 11 outsourced the evaluation task to seven NGOs. As a senior official from the MBCA explained: We have an IFSC which has already completed two of the three year contract. We have 4 experienced two evaluation systems over the past two years and have to encounter a new 5 one next year. We are exhausted now. Our social workers are annoyed with this and they 6 have no idea what they need to do now (SWA 28).
8
Our agency has seven IFSCs in four different districts and we have to deal with four 9 different evaluation agencies. This means that we have to follow four evaluation systems 10 at the same time (SWA 18).
12
Consequently, social workers were unable to provide consistent services and much of their time
13
was involved in gathering data for evaluation.
15
Secondly, as workload targets were a key criterion in the service agreements, social workers had 16 to keep detailed records and worked very hard to meet this requirement. As mentioned previously,
17
seven evaluation agencies had their own outcome criteria; social workers had to prepare a lot of I call them 'computer' social workers. They can write a case file of up to 100 pages,
22
including detailed dialogues in interviews. They must have used more time for preparing 23 20 evaluation documents than providing direct services for users. …Their records and 1 documents will affect whether they can get a 'good' evaluation result (DBCA 10).
3
Thirdly, the existing fragmented evaluation arrangements, with figure-oriented and non-4 standardised outcome assessments, failed to effectively assess the service impact of the IFSCs.
5
Even a senior official was dissatisfied with the existing evaluation system:
A contracted project must show its effectiveness. The current evaluation system is neither 8 scientific nor accurate, which needs to be improved. The local government has spent so 9 much money on IFSCs and their social impact is still unclear (MBCA 02). A representative from an IFSC pointed out the issue caused by the problematic evaluation system.
16
As he/she claimed, 'Government officials and even some social workers have wrongly emphasised 17 workload outputs rather than service impact. It is the changes and improvements in the community 18 and service users that we should stress' (SWA 03). Everyone is a key element in the welfare system and everyone should have the right to 6 express views and participate in welfare provision. The government is changing its 7 functions….it is reducing its role in direct service delivery but purchasing services from 8 professionals. When we talk about diversified service providers, IFSCs are an example 9 of this in the community (MBCA 02).
11
By contrast, some government officials at district and sub-district levels were ambiguous about Another official from a SO reasoned that problems were caused by the hasty decision to introduce
22
IFSCs:
We didn't know anything about the IFSC before its launch. The briefing meeting was 2 held only after we were going to set up the IFSC and start the bidding procedure. We 3 did not know much about an IFSC and the key elements for running it. We could only 4 propose some general terms for potential service providers. The IFSC was established 5 too soon and we were unclear about the idea of it. We did not receive any guidelines 6 from line managers, nor attend any relevant training (SO 25). NGOs to take up the role of direct welfare provider. However, the philosophy of the new policy 16 was not clearly passed on to the lower-level governments. The frontline officials were also not 17 properly briefed and trained to take up the new duties. As a result, they were not capable of The above evidence has shown that social workers are facing various challenges in working with 2 government bureaucrats, addressing the needs of service users and fulfilling their contractual 3 duties. This section will further examine these issues and propose changes to address current 4 contractual problems.
6
The nature of contractual relationship in Guangzhou Enhancing the contracting capacities of government officials
9
The Chinese government has attempted to shift the role of the state from direct service provider to 10 service monitor, through outsourcing social services to NGOs. However, the case of the IFSCs in
11
Guangzhou shows that the decision-making and implementation of the new welfare strategy is top- IFSCs needed to be more than doubled in three months -a very rapid increase. As a result of this 17 administrative order, many lower-level governments set up IFSCs quickly, in order to achieve the 18 target.
20
However, local government officials at district and sub-district levels were not equipped with 21 adequate knowledge and skills to take up their new role. This explains why they treated the IFSCs
22
as a semi-official unit rather than an independent welfare organization. They also failed to design 23 26 a standardized evaluation system that could accurately assess the impact of human services.
1
Clearly, the case of IFSCs in Guangzhou has demonstrated that the contracting out of social 2 services in some parts of China was prematurely introduced without using qualified and 3 experienced welfare officials to prepare detailed service agreements and design an objective and 4 systematic service evaluation system.
6
The experience of IFSCs in Guangzhou has further shown that if a country attempts to adopt the 7 contracting out of social services, it is essential to provide sufficient training for middle-ranking 8 and frontline welfare officials, so that an appropriate contract can be drafted and an effective 9 service monitoring system be established. It should be noted that the demand for skills training in culture is essential to the successful implementation of contracting public services.
17
Conclusion
18
The Chinese government has adopted the contracting out of social services, to reconstruct the 
